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Introduction
Note: the following is a slightly expanded version of the accepted paper. Almost all
additions occur in section §4.
The Hole Argument can be extended to exclude everything. I will argue that there
is nothing in the metaphysical commitment of a substantival manifold which makes it
especially susceptible to the Hole Argument; other objects are just as susceptible to
its terrors. These casualties of the hole demonstrate how critically the Hole Argument
hinges on our notion of determinism and not on the diffeomorphic freedom of general
relativity (GR). Just as Earman and Norton [11] argue that we should not let our
metaphysics run roughshod over the structure of our physical theories, so I will
argue that, in particular, we should not uncritically allow our metaphysics to dictate
what our physical theories must determine. The central conviction which drives the
1
arguments of this paper is that deterministic theories are not required to determine
for future moments what they cannot determine for any present or past moments.†
In order to argue for the above claim, I present two arguments, the “Hole Ar-
gument Against Everything” in §3 and the “Hole-Hole Argument” in §5. In §4, I
provide important caveats and explain in greater detail some of the concepts I em-
ploy in §3 and §5. And finally in §6, I locate my project within the broader post-Hole
Argument literature and respond to a challenge raised by Brighouse [5]. Though the
arguments of this paper are explicitly aimed at the Hole Argument and diffeomor-
phism invariance, the concerns they raise are more generally relevant in working out
the relationship between generic gauge invariances and the nature of determinism.
The position on the Hole Argument which I defend is an instance of “sophisticated
determinism”.
1 The Hole Argument Against Spacetime Points
The Hole Argument, as formulated in [11], is used to argue against the substantivalist
view of spacetime.1 For the uninitiated, I will very briefly retell this tale and then will
show how to widen its result so that everything falls into it. This widening and falling,
I use as a reductio against the form of the argument. The Hole Argument begins by
first considering an open region of spacetime (the hole). One then takes advantage of
the invariant nature of general relativity (GR) under diffemorphisms by shifting all
the objects within the hole to new spacetime locations also within the hole. Such a
shifting means that some trajectories which had passed through the spacetime points
†I thank Nick Huggett, John Norton, Carl Hoefer, Sam Fletcher and Jim Weatherall, either for comments
on earlier drafts of this paper or for a helpful discussion on some of its core ideas. I also thank the
participants of the 2015 philosophy of science meeting in Dubrovnik as well as the southern California
philosophy of physics group.
1See John Norton’s review article [22] for a detailed discussion.
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(x1, y1, z1)n = {α1}n now pass through the spacetime points (x2, y2, z2)m = {α2}m.
In general, the point location of fields get all mixed up. And yet, all our physically
measurable quantities remain the same: the cat on the mat remains on the mat since
both the cat and the mat are similarly shifted by diffeomorphisms.2 The predictions
of GR are independent of substantival localization facts: where on the substantival
manifold physical objects are located.
The crux of the argument is that now, supposedly, we have an indeterministic
theory. Before entering the hole, we don’t know which trajectory we will be on. The
physical data available to us is not enough to determine which trajectory through
spacetime points we will take upon entering the hole region. Will the new trajectory
pass through these points or those? Moreover, while in the region, we gain no help in
determining our trajectory since the physics is the same before and after the shifting.
If we think that GR is a deterministic theory, then we are in trouble. According to
the Hole Argument, GR cannot determine which path we will take due its invariance
under diffeomorphisms.
In terms of possible worlds, standing on a Cauchy slice, there are (at least) two
possible worlds identical in their past, yet, which differ in their future. One of these
possible world has future-trajectories passing through the sets of spacetime points,
{α1}n another has future-trajectories passing through distinct sets {α2}m, and our
physics cannot tell us which world is actual.3 Consequently, the future of any “GR-
possible” world is underdetermined by its past. The conclusion to which we are led
is that we have made a mistake in treating the manifold and its points as being real
things.
2For a precise treatment of this fact, see Earman and Norton [11].
3In fact, each non-trivial diffeomorphism generates a new metric and matter fields physically equivalent to
the originals; thus, in general, each past will have infinitely many possible futures.
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If we deny that it makes sense to localize physical objects with respect to the
manifold and insist that it only makes sense to localize physical objects with respect
to other physically observable objects, then we won’t end up with indeterminism. We
were wrong, so the argument goes, to think of our trajectories as passing through
certain points of the spacetime manifold. Rather, the only trajectories that exist
are “relational trajectories”, i.e. trajectories in terms of physical objects or fields
and not spacetime points. In terms of relational trajectories, general relativity is
deterministic. Before entering the hole, the relational trajectory is determined: we
will pass within some distance of some objects. Thus, we can save determinism
but at the cost of shaving a little more off of the substantivalist’s ontology. Before
presenting the Hole Argument Again Everything, it is essential that I first clarify a
few ideas and guard against a few reasonable confusions.
First, Earman and Norton do not assume that we must deny substantivalism
just because substantivalism entails that GR is indeterministic. Rather, Earman
and Norton argue that if the deterministic status of GR is a physical fact to be
determined by observation, then our metaphysics should not automatically decide
against it. Since substantivalism does automatically decide against determinism,
substantivalism is false. In the following, when referring to Earman and Norton’s
argument against substnativalism, this is the argument I intend.
Second, in order to forestall a potential worry as well as to properly orient the
conversation, we ought to note that the indeterminism generated by the diffeomor-
phism invariance of GR is not merely that the theory cannot determine, decide or
predict where on the manifold we will be next. General relativity cannot determine,
for any moment of time, where on the manifold any physical object is located, not
merely future moments. The upshot of diffeomorphisms in GR is that localizations
with respect to the manifold are not physically determinable facts. The predictions
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of GR are independent of any particular localization of objects within the manifold.
This is particularly important if one thinks about determinism in terms of solving
some initial value problem in a globally hyperbolic spacetime. It is usually thought
that if a theory is deterministic then, provided all the physical data on some initial
Cauchy slice, the theory will determine the evolution of this data across all future
Cauchy slices.4 Another way of phrasing the question which rests at the heart of this
paper is “what are the physical data which our deterministic theory must determine?”
Are spacetime point locations part of this data even though the predictions of GR are
invariant under diffeomorphisms? Do we require GR to determine at which future
spacetime-point-locations the cat is, even though GR cannot say at what spacetime
points the cat is now or at any moments in the past? My answer is “no”.
Since for any initial Cauchy slice, GR is diffeomorphically invariant, spacetime-
point-locations are not relevant data for the initial value problem and consequently
are not relevant for assessing whether or not GR is deterministic. In the following
section, I will use the Hole Argument Against Everything to argue that we ought to
qualify what we require GR to determine in the way I have suggested here. Namely,
that GR is required to determine only those future facts to which the theory is
sensitive. Or in other words, GR is only required to determine facts which are
included in the physical content of the theory. Or, again, GR is only required to
determine certain qualitative properties [3, 2, 20] which, in the words of David Lewis
[16], are the “perfectly natural” ones.
In the following section, I will argue that the notion of determinism used in the
Hole Argument ought to be modified because, as stated, the form of the original Hole
Argument is invalid. I will do this by providing a counter example to the form of the
4To be sure, initial value problems or “Cauchy problems” in mathematics are not usually stated in terms
of determinism but in terms of solving some differential equation.
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Hole Argument which, putatively, results in an absurd conclusion. In generating the
following reductio, I will argue that far more than spacetime points are in danger of
falling into the hole. I will argue that any metaphysical structure (persons, norms,
essences, powers, Aristotelian levels of being) is in danger of the hole precisely because
our physical theories do not determine metaphysical properties or facts. The effect
of this argument, reductio ad absurdum, will be to force us to analyze the nature of
determinism and, derivatively, what we take certain physical theories to be about. I
will argue that, in order to avoid the counter examples of §3, we must limit the scope
of determinism. However, in limiting determinism to scope over just those facts or
properties of the world for which GR is a theory, substantivalism no longer threatens
GR with indeterminism. The following section then has the following structure:
(1) The form of the Hole Argument is invalid since everything falls prey
to it.
(2) In preventing everything from falling prey to the Hole Argument we
must limit determinism to just that which is included in the physical
content of GR.
(3) Substantival localization facts do not belong to the physical content
of GR.
Therefore:
(4) Substantival localization facts do not threaten GR with indetermin-
ism.
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(5) Since the Hole Argument argues for indeterminism based on substan-
tival localization facts, the Hole Argument is invalid.
I will argue in §5 that we cannot bite the bullet and accept the reductio of (1), and
will argue throughout this paper for premises (2) and (3).
As a final caveat, the following argument is meant to result in a reductio and has
been designed to annoy. One ought to feel that an error has been made, because it
has! I will use this error to motivate the analysis involved in defending premises (2)
and (3).
2 The Hole Argument Against Everything
Throughout the remainder of this paper, I will use the terms ‘physical’, ‘physical
content’ and ‘metaphysical’ in intuitive though slightly technical senses which I won’t
fully explain until §4. I will say that some property or fact is included in the physical
content of a theory if and only if that theory constrains or predicts, for at least one
moment of time, the precise value of that property or truth value of that fact. If
there is no physical theory for which some property or fact is included in its physical
content, I will call these properties or facts ‘metaphysical’.5 I realize that these
terms have a long and harried history in philosophy, and I do not intend to solve
paradoxes or difficulties inherent in these notions. I only want to make their use
explicit. As we will see, these concepts are already implicitly at play in the original
Hole Argument. (See §4 for a longer treatment of the concept “physical content” as
well as “determinism”.)
Given that our scientific theories cannot detect the effects of our overarching
5If a certain assumption is necessary in order for a physical theory to be conceptually coherent, I will refrain
from calling that assumption metaphysical.
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metaphysics, our scientific descriptions of the world are thereby invariant under what
I will call ‘diffeo-metaphysms’ (a protologism). I will define a ‘diffeo-metaphysm’ to
be a mapping between possible worlds which differ only with respect to some partic-
ular metaphysical facts. Performing a diffeo-metaphysm on a world changes one or
more of its metaphysical facts. For instance, one diffeo-metaphysm might rearrange
which Aristotelian “levels of being” some particular objects have, whereas another
might reassign which angels propel which planets, or which church Father is the pa-
tron saint of salt miners.6 Interestingly, since substantival localization facts cannot
be determined by GR (or any other empirical science), these facts are metaphysical
in the sense just defined. Accordingly, a diffeomorphism, which shifts the substan-
tival spacetime locations of objects, is an instance of a diffeo-metaphysm. I will use
the form of the Hole Argument and the fact that our physical theories remain in-
variant across possible worlds related by particular diffeo-metaphysms, to eradicate
everything – or, just about everything.
As an example of how to extend the Hole Argument to everything, consider a
world like our own but which also contains certain objects which I will call “persons”.7
For the sake of argument, assume that a single person exists at different places and
times and does so by having a soul. According to this metaphysics, souls are a kind
of non-physical substance which distinguish persons from one another. Persons are
embodied souls, where ‘body’ does not necessarily refer to human bodies. According
to this metaphysics, a person follows a particular soul and not the body in which
it is housed. In other words, a person may exchange all of her physical properties
and retain her identity but cannot replace her soul without ceasing to be the same
individual. In fact, under this metaphysics, it does not even make sense to speak of
6Which so happens to be Saint Cunegunda or ‘Kinga’.
7Hoefer [14] puts a similar argument to a different use.
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a person exchanging their soul. Let us define a “thing” to be the result of stripping
a person of its soul and stipulate that a thing becomes a person by gaining a soul.8
Here, I have merely provided definitions; we may not think that souls, persons, or
things as defined here exist, yet these concepts are familiar and cogent. By cogent,
I mean that these concepts are not self-contradictory and that there are logically
possible words which contain things and persons as they have been defined here.
It turns out, and not surprisingly, that GR is soul-invariant. We can associate to
each thing any soul we wish, and the description of the world given by GR remains
the same. In the case of spacetime points, we may have worried that GR was
somehow dependent on them since spacetime points are implicitly referred to by
the coordinates of GR; however, this is not so for souls. Souls don’t show up at all in
GR which makes its invariance under soul swapping all the more obvious. If it makes
us feel better, we could build an extended phase space for GR in order to explicitly
include a degree of freedom for souls, and then demonstrate that the predictions of
GR are soul-invariant. However, doing so would not change our argument and the
mathematics involved would be troublesome.
Following Earman and Norton, let us consider an open region (the hole) of space-
time and let us perform a diffeo-metaphysm on whatever persons there are in the
hole. We will map this set of persons to a new set of persons by exorcising their souls
and gluing them onto new things.9 Moreover, unlike diffeomorphisms, this mapping
of souls need not even be smooth.10 As we might expect, such a diffeo-metaphysm
introduces indeterminism into GR. Standing on a Cauchy surface outside the open
8For the sake of the following argument, persons are meant to be three-dimensional and not four.
9Note that I am not claiming that a person gets a new soul, for that would be incoherent given our
construction. This mapping reassociates souls with things not persons.
10I intend this to be tongue-in-cheek, but perhaps I should explain. In considering diffeo-metaphysms, we
are not doing mathematical physics and thus need not be tied down by smoothness requirements.
9
region, we cannot say what any person will be doing inside of the hole. Frank, the
cat on the mat now may still be Frank the cat then, or it may be Frank the dog
at the window then and GR cannot tell us which.11 GR cannot tell us where, at
any future moment, any person is even if we were to specify where all the persons
currently are. If we think that physics is deterministic, which we do, then we are in
trouble. General relativity cannot determine which path persons will take through
the hole due to its invariance under diffeo-metaphysisms. (For related concerns put
to different purposes, see [14, 15])
Since we started this project by following the lead of Earman and Norton, it is only
fitting that we finish it as they do: since persons qua embodied souls automatically
decide against determinism, persons are not real things. The actual world does not
include souls or persons but does include things. In the actual world, GR does
determine what trajectories things take inside the hole. GR might not tell us where
Frank is at any future moment, but it does tell us where cat-things are. Physics is
safe but so much the worse for souls and Frank. Who knew that general relativity and
some “unobjectionable” assumptions about determinism would yield such interesting
results? If persons could fall prey to the hole, I suspect that no thing, and perhaps
nothing, is safe.12
In response to the soul-Hole Argument, the suspicion which we all probably share,
is not that persons are somehow in danger now whereas before they weren’t, but that
the form of the Hole Argument does too much. The trouble with the above argument
is that it assumes physics is supposed to say something about souls, or that GR is
supposed to determine soul-facts. This mistake enters the argument in assuming
11In other words, the person associated with the cat-object now may still be associated with the cat-object
then, or it may be associated with the dog-object at the window then.
12See [13] The point is, that which we call a thing is not metaphysically innocent. Metaphysical assumptions
go into how we carve up the world.
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that, due to its diffeo-metaphysm, GR is indeterministic. This assumption is true
only if we define the determinism of GR to include both metaphysical as well as
physical facts.13
The Hole Argument against persons qua souls assumes a dichotomy analogous to
that used by Earman and Norton in the original Hole Argument:
either (a) accept radical indeterminism,
or (b) deny substantivalism.
In the case of the soul-Hole Argument, the dichotomy becomes:
either (a) accept radical indeterminism,
or (b) deny persons.
If, as I suspect, we do not think that the truth of GR nor the determinism of phys-
ical theories has anything to do with the existence of persons qua embodied souls,
then I suggest we reject this dichotomy in favor of option (c): though GR fails to
determine soul-facts, GR remains deterministic for determinism does not require GR
to determine soul-facts or any other metaphysical property or fact.
If persons have non-physical, non-supervening minds, we do not require GR to
determine what hopes and dreams may occupy those minds, rather we require only
that it determine in which head or vat the corresponding brain resides. The point
of introducing the Hole Argument Against Everything is to draw our attention to
this hidden assumption. In order for the original Hole Argument to work, we must
first assume that a proper notion of determinism includes the requirement that GR
determine substantival-facts. The Hole Argument works only if we first assume that
GR ought to determine which exact set of empirically unobservable substantival
13This is exactly Brighouse’s point [4].
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points our physical objects pass through. We don’t think that the related assumption
is true for souls or any other metaphysical (or ‘physically-uninteresting’) facts, so why
do we think that it is true for substantival-facts?
One answer is to note that unlike soul-facts, GR putatively encodes substantival-
facts in virtue of the fact that the models of GR 〈M, T (p), g(p)〉 include fields defined
at spacetime points. Given that the form of the Hole Argument seems to result in a
reductio, one response is to argue that I have failed to include an essential, though
hidden, premise. That premise being that substantival GR is, in fact, a theory
whose physical content includes spacetime points and the substantival localization
facts related to them. If this is true, then it could be argued that in order for
substantival GR to be physically deterministic, it must determine all such facts. In
other words, option (c) would not be true for the original Hole Argument. If this is
the case, then there is an important disanalogy between the original Hole Argument
and my soul-Hole Argument or the more general Hole Argument Against Everything.
The reason for including this essential premise is the fact that spacetime points
seem to show up in the models of GR: 〈M, T (p), g(p)〉. Yet, is the presence of
manifold points (p) or spatial variables of them sufficient for justifying the claim
that the physical content of substantival GR includes the substantival point location
of objects? In other words, does the mere presence of some variable entail that
a theory determines what exactly happens at values of that variable? Would the
physical content of GR automatically increase to include soul-facts merely by adding
a soul degree of freedom to the mathematics of our theory? The answer to both of
these questions is “no”.
At the beginning of this section, I offered to formulate an extension of GR with a
soul-degree of freedom. Under the extended theory, GR+, the models 〈M′, T (p, s), g(p, s)〉,
now include fields which are functions of spacetime points as well as a soul-degree
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of freedom (s). There is no need to actually construct such an odd extension to GR
since, in order for this extension to be empirically equivalent to the original theory
we will need to force the s variables to be pure gauge (just as the spatial variables
are). According to this imagined construction, both GR and GR+ have the same
empirical content – the new one just has some extra non-empirical baggage.14 The
point is, even if GR+ did include a soul degrees of freedom, no physicists would
fooled into believing that the mere presence of s in the theory’s formulation auto-
matically entails that the physical content of GR+ included souls. My contention is
that the physical content of a theory cannot be read off of the mathematics of that
theory but must be teased out by putting the mathematics of the theory in contact
with experiments.15
One of the lessons of modern physics is that just because some degrees of freedom
show up in our model, this does not automatically entail that they are physical
degrees of freedom of the system. Since GR is diffeomorphically invariant, we know
that spacetime points, like soul-degrees of freedom, are in fact not physical. At least
they are not physical in the sense defined in this paper: there is no moment of time
for which the theory makes any predictions which depend on some set of objects
being located at the spacetime points {α1}n rather than {α2}m (see §4).
That substnatival localization facts are not included in the physical content of
GR should not be surprising given the homogeneity of the substantivalist’s manifold,
and it certainly would not have surprised Newton who announced the unknowability
of absolute space. According to both Newtonian mechanics and general relativity,
we cannot trust a na¨ıve inspection of the variables of the theory in order to know
14Throughout this paper, I have attempted to make use of the term ‘physical’ and not ‘empirical’. I assume,
however, that empirical content is sufficient for physical content.
15For related remarks see [14, 7].
13
what the physical degrees of freedom are, but we must also take into account the set
of invariances enjoyed by the theory.
Since Newtonian mechanics is invariant under Galilean transformations and GR
under diffeomorphisms, neither of these theory’s predictions is dependent on the
spacetime-point-locations of material objects. As a reminder, though diffeomor-
phisms frustrate our ability to make predictions regarding the future location of
objects, they also frustrate our ability to describe, for any moment of time, the ab-
solute location of objects. Though GR and Newtonian mechanics define fields which
take values at spacetime points, which exact set of spacetime points is irrelevant,
any will do.16 Thus, since neither theory “claims” to determine where any particular
field-value is located in substantival space, it is not true that GR encodes substanti-
val localization facts. Given the diffeomorphism invariance of GR, we have no more
reason to think that GR ought to determine substantival facts than we have reason to
suppose that GR ought to determine soul-facts. What exactly GR should determine
I cannot say; however, given that neither souls nor substantival locations make any
difference to the physically measurable predictions of the theory, neither are included
in the physical content of GR and neither are relevant for the physical determinism
of GR.
My solution to the reductio generated by the form of the Hole Argument is to deny
that the notion of physical determinism requires our physical theories to determine
non-physical facts such as soul-facts or substantival-facts, and it seems that Einstein
was of a similar opinion. According to Einstein [27, 21], the physical content of
GR is fully captured by point-coincidences between physical objects. And, it is
this realization which allowed Einstein to move beyond the Hole Argument and
16Any set of points will do so long as they are appropriately related to some diffeomorphically invariant
model of GR.
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accept the generally covariant formulation of GR. If the physical content of GR
is captured by the point-coincidences between material objects and not also their
absolute location within a substantival manifold, then the indeterminism threatened
by the Hole Argument can be ignored since the indeterminism is of a non-physical
kind.17
Both the original Hole Argument and the soul-Hole Argument are instances of
the more general Hole Argument Against Everything. The Hole Argument Against
Everything can be modified to accommodate any theory about the world which lies
outside the scope of GR – our theory of universals, the truth of the Axiom of Choice,
what we take to be the distinguishing mark of abstract objects, whether or not
there is absolute time in addition to relativistic time, whether there is a “before” the
beginning of the physical universe, whether or not skepticism is true, or who is the
patron saint of salt miners – each lead to versions of the Hole Argument precisely
because GR says nothing about them.
In summary, the form of the Hole Argument does too much in virtue of using
an unqualified notion of determinism. If we fail to limit what we require of our
deterministic theories, then spacetime points, souls, and most everything else, can
be threatened by hole-type arguments for the argument forms are the same. I have
argued, in particular, that since the physical content of GR does not include sub-
stantival localization facts, our notion of physical determinism ought not require that
GR determine them. And if not the original Hole Argument is invalid.
17Earman [9] concedes to Maudlin that this might be an uninteresting form of indeterminism. I argue
further that it is no form of determinism at all.
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3 Interlude
Sections §1 − 3 constitute, what I take to be, the heart of this paper. In §5, I
provide the Hole-Hole Argument to demonstrate that, if we do not limit the scope of
determinism, the debate over the substantival-relational nature of spacetime would
be rendered meaningless in virtue of committing a category error. In essence, I will
argue that one cannot bite the proverbial bullet and allow the Hole Argument Against
Everything to swallow whatever it gets its hands on: spacetime points, haecceities,
Aristotelian levels of being, etcetera. In §6, I demonstrate how this paper fits within
the broader post-Hole Argument literature and, in particular, its relation to the work
of [5, 3, 20, 15, 4]. In the remainder of this section, I will explain a bit more carefully
how I have used the concepts of “physical content” and “determinism”.
For the sake of this paper, some property or kind of fact is included within
the physical content of some theory if and only if there is at least one moment of
time for which the theory describes or makes predictions regarding the value of that
property or the truth of that fact. For example, if for some moment of time and
some theoretical context, a theory makes predictions regarding the properties {Pi},
and at another moment of time, the properties {Pj}, then the properties {Pi} and
{Pj} are included in the physical content of the theory. This theory, then, is said to
be deterministic if, for all moments of time, it predicts, rightly or wrongly, the value
of the properties {Pi} and {Pj}. While I intend these definitions to be obvious, it is
in fact not at all obvious when the definitions apply for it is not always clear which
properties do in fact reside within the physical content of a theory.
I will take determinism to be a property that a theory possesses when that theory
determines, decides, predicts, for all moments of time, those properties of the world
for which that theory is a theory. In other words, a theory is deterministic if it
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determines, decides, or predicts, for all moments, of time those properties of the
world which are included in the physical content of the theory. By limiting the
notion of determinism to apply to only the physical content of a theory, I intend to
make explicit the fact that theories have limited scopes of applicability. Each physical
theory is about some things and not about others, and our notion of determinism
ought to reflect this limited scope. Consider the following cases as means of making
these definitions concrete.
In the case of quantum mechanics (QM), since there are moments of time for
which QM predicts or describes the position of electrons, electron-positions are in-
cluded in the physical content of QM. Among other things, particle-position is what
QM is about. However, since QM cannot predict electron positions for all moments
of time, the theory fails to be deterministic. In Newtonian mechanics, since there
are moments of time for which the theory describes the position of baseballs, such
properties are included in the physical content of Newtonian mechanics. Ignoring
Earman’s “space invaders” [8], since Newtonian mechanics predicts for all moments
of time the position of baseballs, the theory is deterministic with respect these prop-
erties. Indeed, Newtonian mechanics is deterministic with respect to all properties
or facts for which Newtonian mechanics is a theory. As such, Newtonian mechanics
is deterministic simplicitor.
In contrast with particle and baseball positions, since there is no moment of time
or theoretical context for which either QM or Newtonian mechanics describes or
predicts the truth value of the Axiom of Choice, this truth value is not part of either
theory’s physical content. Thus, when adjudicating whether or not QM or Newtonian
mechanics is deterministic, the truth value of the Axiom of Choice is irrelevant. I
do not intend any of this to be controversial. I intend only to make explicit and
somewhat more precise what we all take for granted when thinking about physical
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determinism.
Now, in order for a theory to be said to describe, determine, or predict the value
of some property, it must be the case that the empirical results of the theory uniquely
specify the value of that property for at least one moment of time for some possible
situation. Thus, according to the empirical resources of the theory, whether or not
these resources are practically feasible, if all possible empirical evidence can never
discern between some putative property P and its doppelga¨nger P ′, then neither
P nor P ′ are included in the physical content of the theory. And this of course is
exactly the situation for substantivalism: none of the predications of GR, for any
moment of time, depend on which set of points {α1}n or {α2}m the material of
the universe passes through. Thus, substantival localization facts are not included
in GR’s physical content and are thereby irrelevant for deciding the deterministic
status of GR.
This “uniqueness” requirement tightens the definition for belonging to a theory’s
physical content and brings this notion into alignment with our attitude towards
gauge degrees of freedom. Indeed, we tend to treat the U(1) symmetry of QM differ-
ently than we treat the quantum observables of the theory. We interpret the latter as
representing genuine physical properties and we bicker over the interpretation of the
former. The interpretational debate over the U(1) gauge freedom is most interesting
under circumstances such as the Bohm-Aharonov effect in which the gauge potential
seems to make an actual difference in what is observed. If it was not for this tenuous
connection to empirical observations, there would be little reason for interpreting this
mathematical gauge structure as being included in the physical content of QM. This
is not to say that the gauge degrees of freedom fail to denote anything, I am agnostic
on this point. Perhaps gauge degrees of freedom denote metaphysical potentialities
or some other physically opaque aspects of reality.
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In defining “physical content” in a manner which rules out gauge degrees of free-
dom or, more generally, the properties P and P ′, I am adopting a non-trivial stance
in the debate over gauge variables. However, the contrary position is rather unap-
pealing for two reasons. In allowing gauge variables to denote physical properties,
we would be, in essence, including within the physical content of a theory, properties
which make no empirical difference, directly or indirectly, for any situation allowed
by the theory. Why believe that a physical theory is about something for which it
can say nothing?18 Again, I am not saying that gauge variables fail to represent in
toto, but merely that whatever they represent should be distinguished from the full
blooded physical content of the theory.
In addition, if we allow gauge variables to denote physical content while still
requiring that the theory determine this content for all moments of time in order for
the theory to be deterministic, we would make determinism impossible for theories
with anything like gauge freedom. Since there is no moment of time for which such
theories nail down the value of these gauge properties, there is, by definition, at
least one moment for which the theory cannot determine precisely the value of these
properties. Thus, all such theories are automatically indeterministic. Under this
proposal, quantum mechanics would be ruled indeterministic because of its U(1)
gauge freedom and Electromagnetism for its gauge potential. If we do not tighten
what we mean by “physical content,” we force indeterminism on all theories with
anything like gauge freedom. And this, of course, is not something that Earman and
Norton will countenance.
If the reader will recall (§2), Earman and Norton’s argument against substantival
18In cases where classical gauge degrees of freedom are quantized and then, for whatever reason, become
empirically salient, we have moved into a new theoretical context and have to re-evaluate what we take
to be physical.
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spacetime hinges on the fact that the metaphysics of substantivalism automatically
decides against determinism. However, the opposite situation arises if we do not rule
out gauge variables and the like from denoting physical structure: indeterminism
becomes a matter of definition and not of empirical observation. Allow me six short
caveats before moving onto the Hole-Hole Argument.
First, I am not committed to the term ‘metaphysics’. It does not matter what
we label the set of facts with which physics cannot help. We could just as well label
facts of this kind as ‘X-facts’, or ‘physically-uninteresting-facts’ or ‘whatever else
there is’. More often in the Hole Argument literature, the terms ‘non-qualitative’ or
‘haecceistic’ [5, 3, 2, 20, 14, 15, 25] are used to denote, roughly, what I am calling
metaphysical facts, while ‘qualitative’ or ‘perfectly natural’ [16, 25, 6] are used to
denote, roughly, the set of physical properties or facts. I suspect that the terms ‘ob-
servable’ and ‘theoretical’ do not correspond with my ‘physical’ and ‘metaphysical’.
For instance, there are non-observable terms (i.e. theoretical terms like ‘electron’)
which I would still categorize as being physical since our physical theories constrain
their properties. I have opted not to use the terms ‘qualitative’, ‘haecceistic’, or ‘per-
fectly natural’ since their inclusion would only add an additional layer of obfuscation.
For the technical sense of these terms, see the cited works.
Second, I assume that what counts as physical and what counts as metaphysical
is decided by some thoroughly theory-ladened process. As the history of science
demonstrates, our acceptance of some set of theories and their interpretations con-
strains, to a large extent, what counts as physical and metaphysical. Though the
concept of “physical content” is vague and paradigm dependent, we regularly and
successfully rely on it and have a good, though tacit, handle on it. For example, we
all agree that the taxonomy of fungi and not Aristotelian “levels of being” lay within
the scope of biology, that the ideal gas law is about moles of particles and not of
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the burrowing mammal, and that the content of modern cosmology is not same as
ancient Egyptian cosmology. Our agreement on these points indicates that we share
some core understanding of what “physical content” amounts to, even if we cannot
fully explicate it.
Third, part of what makes the division between the physical and metaphysical
aspects of reality theory-ladened arises from the uncertainty over how to interpret
gauge degrees of freedom or spaces of transformations under which a theory is invari-
ant. Newtonian mechanics is invariant under Galilean transformations which entail
that the theory cannot answer such questions as “where is the Earth absolutely lo-
cated in substantival space?” Though, Newtonian mechanics can answer other kinds
of substantival questions such as “does the Earth move in an absolutely (substanti-
val) straight or curved line?”19 According to the terms defined in this paper, from
the perspective of a substantival interpretation of Newtonian mechanics, the first
question corresponds to a metaphysical fact while the second, to a physical fact.20
This stands in contrast with Aristotelian cosmology according to which space is not
homogenous or isotropic; consequently, the absolute location of an object does affect
the physical character and potential dynamics of the object. In contrast with New-
ton then, the absolute location, whether it be superlunar or sublunar, is a physical
fact on the Aristotelian theory, with empirically distinct consequences. Here “lu-
nar” is not meant to indicate the moon but the absolute boundary between elements
composed of quintessence and those composed of water, earth, air and fire.21 Thus,
19This situation holds for general relativity as well. The theory cannot determine for any past, present or
future moment where any object is located but it can determine whether or not it moves along a geodesic
(straight line).
20Under a relational interpretation, neither question is well defined since they make reference to objects
which do not exist.
21These consequences will turn out to be false in the long run as orbiting objects eventually plummet to
the Earth.
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whether or not a certain fact counts as metaphysical or physical depends on the
overarching theoretical context in which the fact is being asserted. The distinction
is theory-ladened.
Fourth, one must not worry that if determinism requires only that theories de-
termine the physical facts which lie in their scope that determinism will be automat-
ically satisfied. In order to see that this fear is misplaced, consider our paradigmatic
indeterministic theory – quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics stipulates that
observables encode physical content and yet the theory is explicitly indeterministic
with respect to this content. And, important for the purposes of this paper, QM is
not indeterministic because of its U(1) gauge freedom.
Fifth, one might dislike the fact that my argument rests on nebulous concepts such
as “physical content” and might thereby be biased against it. I share this concern.
However, any defense from the Hole Argument Against Everything must say, in some
form or another, that GR is not about “everything” and is only about spacetime
points and matter fields, and likewise any response to the soul-hole argument must
claim that GR is not about souls and in so doing, both responses have already
implicitly made use of “physical content” in claiming what GR is “about”.
Sixth, though the arguments I have presented here are able to save the substanti-
valist from the Hole Argument, this does not entail that the substantivalist is off the
philosophical hook. As this conversation and those like it make abundantly clear, the
substantivalist is committed to properties or facts which are not physical. We might
wonder how one can be justified in believing in the existence of something which we
can not measure or otherwise detect? This positivistic concern is an old bedfellow
but, strictly speaking, it is not the Hole Argument. And besides, we cannot do away
with all metaphysics for, as I will argue in §5, in order to get the Hole Argument
off the ground, we have to first assume that spacetime has a very particular modal
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property which we also cannot measure or otherwise detect.
.
4 A Hole Argument Against The Hole Argument:
the Hole-Hole Argument
This section addresses the reader whose reaction to the soul-Hole Argument is to
accept the putative reductio. There is no strict contradiction in inferring from the
soul-Hole Argument that general relativity requires the nonexistence of souls on
threat of indeterminism. Likewise, one might very well respond to the Hole Argu-
ment Against Everything by eradicating from their ontology any and all structures
which threaten the determinism of GR: souls, angels, powers, dispositions, univer-
sals, and patron saints. In essence, such a response refuses to modify the banal and
unqualified notion of determinism used in the original Hole Argument as well as the
Hole Argument Against Everything.
My purpose in using the following Hole-Hole Argument is to show that those who
would wield the Hole Argument must first be committed to the existence of at least
one non-qualitative or metaphysical property of spacetime. Namely, that spacetime
is the sort of thing for which it is possible to be either substantival or relational. By
entering into the substantival-relational debate, we implicitly assume that there is
at least one logically possible world wherein spacetime is substantival and another
wherein it is relational. Equivalently, in debating between substantival and relational
ontologies of spacetime, we have to first assume that we have correctly categorized
spacetime as the sort of thing which can be substantival or relational. My claim is
not that there is something wrong with this assumption but merely that such modal
(or categorical) properties are metaphysical from the standpoint of GR.
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The trouble enters here: if we fail to qualify the notion of determinism used
in building hole-type arguments, then there is a hole-type argument which utilizes
the above modal assumption to demonstrate the meaninglessness of the substantival-
relational debate. Thus, either the substantival-relational debate is meaningless, and
with it the original Hole Argument, or the notion of determinism employed must be
modified. At the very least, the notion of determinism ought to be modified so as
not to require GR to determine the modal properties of spacetime.
The following Hole-Hole Argument is slightly more abstract than the previous
Hole Argument Against Everything, though the form of the argument is the same.
The increase in abstraction comes not from the logic of the argument since, in form,
it is the same argument, but rather arises from the kind of objects being consid-
ered. In the Hole Argument against persons, the relevant objects and properties are
persons and what souls are associated with what things. In the following Hole-Hole
Argument, the object is spacetime itself and the relevant property is modal in nature;
we will assume that spacetime is possibly substantival and possibly relational.
Consider the following two possible worlds, Ws and Wr, which are physically – as
I have defined this term – identical to each other and to the actual world. Included
in the ontology of Ws is a substantival spacetime manifold in which all physical
objects are located; whereas in Wr, there is no substantival spacetime manifold.
Perhaps spacetime, in Wr, is merely a relational structure defined to hold between
the material objects of the world be these particles, fields, or some as yet undiscovered
fundamental objects. In order to streamline the following discussion, I will describe
the non-substantival option as being relational, though this might not be the only
non-substantival choice. To be clear then, there are no physical differences between
Ws, Wr and the actual world. None of our physical theories make predications which
turn on the difference between Ws and Wr, none of our physical theories contain
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physical laws which decide between Ws and Wr, and we certainly do not have any
instruments which can detect whether or not there is, in fact, a substantival manifold.
To reiterate, in considering the Hole Argument to begin with, we assume, in the
actual world, that there are two distinct possible worlds, Ws and Wr, one of which
is in fact the actual world.22 If this assumption is true, I will say that the actual
world has property P. In the first place, P tells us something about a modal-access
relation which holds from the actual world to some possible worlds. If the actual
world has P, then Ws and Wr are logically possible with respect to it. In the second
place, P tells us that one of these possible worlds is the actual world. I realize that
P is an unnatural way of expressing the assumption of the substantival-relational
debate, but it is, in fact, what we assume and will play an important role later in
this argument.
Given that the actual world and each of theW -worlds are observationally identical
– in the way that was explained in the previous section – any GR model of the
actual world is a GR model of these possible worlds. In other words Wr and Ws
are equally modeled by the same ordered triplet 〈M, T, g〉. In accordance with hole-
type arguments, we ask: can GR determine, of the actual world, whether or not the
future will include a substantival spatial structure or whether the future will include
a relational spatial structure? In other words, is the future included in Wr or Ws?
Such a question should strike us as odd. Why would we ever expect GR to answer
such a strange, erudite, and metaphysical question? And, this is exactly the right
response. However, I claim that this is the response we should have to the original
Hole Argument (see option (c) in §3), and I will return to this response later.
22Earman and Norton do not assume that spacetime is substantival or relational but rather assume that
spacetime is either substantival or not substantival. This difference will not make a difference in what
follows.
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As things stand, there are two possible futures, one relational and the other
substantival and since these two possibilities pick out the exact same models in GR,
GR does not determine which is actual. Thus, if the actual world has property
P, then GR is indeterministic. Now, one might object that, given a full set of
metaphysical facts, we philosophers could indeed decide whether or not the future is
substantival. The intuition is that if the initial data of some Cauchy slice includes
the fact that the spatial structure is substantival, then “metaphysical consistency”
requires that all future slices are also substantival. There are some subtleties in
this objection and alternate ways of getting around it but, for the time being, I will
simply note that the task is not what “metaphysical consistency” requires but what
our physical theory can determine. GR cannot determine whether future spatial
regions have a substantival or relational structure.
We might respond to the failure of GR to determine these erudite facts in one of
the following three ways:
(a) Accept radical indeterminism.
(b) Bite the proverbial bullet: following the lead of Earman and Norton,
we need to give up whatever background metaphysical commitment is
responsible for generating the plurality of possible futures and is thereby
responsible for the indeterminism of GR.
(c) Qualify ‘determinism’: in order for a physical theory to be determin-
istic it need only determine the physical facts within the theory’s scope
and not also metaphysical facts which lie outside that scope. (See option
(c) in §3.)
My suggestion, as always, is that we opt for (c) but in order to see this, let us first
explore option (b).
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According to the Hole-Hole Argument and option (b), we ought to deny that the
actual world has property P. Hence, we were wrong in thinking that Ws and Wr
were possible worlds. However, if we deny that the actual world could be either Ws
or Wr, then the debate over the substantival vs. relational structure of spacetime is
confused. Just as it would be a category mistake to argue over the I.Q. of opaque
glass or the flavor of pi, so also it would be a category mistake to argue over the
substantival-relational nature of spacetime. If the Hole-Hole Argument is correct
and we pursue option (b), then the original Hole Argument, literally, does not make
any sense. However, if we think that the original Hole Argument does makes sense
and that spacetime is the sort of thing that might be substantival or relational, then
I suggest that we pursue option (c).
According to option (c), we must limit what we require of deterministic theories.
Do we require GR to determine whether or not certain tiny regions of spacetime
are substantival in order for the theory to be deterministic? No. Likewise, if the
actual world were substantival, would we require GR to determine the spacetime-
point-location of physical objects? Presumably not. The point is, as soon as we start
debating what we mean by ‘deterministic physical theory’, the substantivalist has
an avenue for defending herself against the original Hole Argument; namely, she can
simply claim that since spacetime-point-locations make no physical difference to the
predictions of any physical theory, these facts are metaphysical in nature and not
under the purview of what we require physical theories to determine.
5 The post-Hole Argument Literature
In this section, I will locate my project within the broader post-Hole Argument lit-
erature and will respond to an important objection from Brighouse [5]. It turns
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out that the Hole-Argument Against Everything can be reconstructed from a com-
bination of positions held by Horwich and Brighouse. Horwich [15] argues that the
same trouble facing spacetime points, also faces electrons and other objects as well.
Roughly, Horwich asks us to consider two identical worlds which differ only in terms
of which electrons are where. In world one, electron A is here and electron B is there.
While in in world two electron, A is there and electron B is here. Since these worlds
are qualitatively identical, our physical theories are invariant under a swapping of
electrons. Thus, our physical laws do not uniquely determine what the future will
be like.
Should we conclude then that electrons are somehow illusory? Horwich says
“no”, and uses the qualitative similarity between world one and two to argue that
they are actually the same world. Similarly, we can adapt Horwich’s analysis to
the case of the Hole Argument and argue that all diffeomorphically related “hole-
worlds” are merely different descriptions of the same world. We can avoid the terror
of the hole and maintain an unqualified notion of determinism by shrinking the
space of possible worlds from many to one. If there is only one possible world
described by diffeomorphisms, then the future of any Cauchy slice cannot fail to
be deterministic. The spirit of this response is codified in [6] as well as in the
the sophisticated substantivalist position championed by Hoefer [14]. The much
noted downside to this response is that it cannot accommodate the substantialist’s
intuition, which Earman and Norton [11] refer to as the acid test of substantivalism:
“shifted worlds” represent different possibilities. This is not to say that the view
is wrong, but if one takes Earman and Norton’s acid test seriously, sophisticated
substantivalism is no longer an option.
In [4] Brighouse argues that all we require of our physical theories is that they
physically determine the future given the past. Facts such as which points on the
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manifold are occupied by which objects, are not physical facts, according to her, and
thus are not determined by our physical theories. Brighouse’s position [3, 4] and my
own are identical in this regard and are instances of what Brighouse [5] calls “sophis-
ticated determinism”. A benefit of this position is that it naturally accommodates
the substantivalist’s conviction that shifted worlds represent genuinely distinct pos-
sible worlds, though, admittedly, worlds which differ only in terms of “metaphysical”
properties. While Brighouse and I share the same conclusion, we differ in how we
come to it. In particular, Brighouse does not argue for her conclusion using the Hole
Argument Against Everything or the Hole-Hole Argument, as I have done here. As
far as I am aware, these two arguments are the only arguments in the literature
which have been provided in defense of sophisticated determinism. One can recon-
struct my position as a combination of Horwich’s and Brighouse’s: I argue along
with Horwich that many things are are threatened by hole-type arguments and con-
clude, along with Brighouse, that hole arguments wrongly use unqualified notions of
determinism.
Three main lines of response developed shortly after Earman and Norton’s paper:
metric essentialism [18], sophisticated substantivalism [14, 6, 17, 26], and sophisti-
cated determinism [3, 20, 4, 25].23 The solutions provided by the metric essentialist
and the sophisticated substantivalist are tangential to those provided by the sophis-
ticated determinist. One can believe that the metric is essential for the identity of
spacetime, or that spacetime points fail to have primitive identities and still agree
with a sophisticated understanding of determinism. Admittedly though, introducing
a sophisticated notion of determinism will lessen the need for an alternative solution
to the Hole Argument.
23Along with [24], I am using the term ‘sophisticated substantivalism’ more narrowly than [10] intended
when they coined the expression.
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In addition to either sophisticated substantivalism or metric essentialism, there
are “technical” solutions to the Hole Argument which are also tangential to so-
phisticated determinism. Two recent examples come to mind. Jim Weatherall [28]
implicitly accepts the putative conflict between determinism and substantivalism
and proposes a conceptually sophisticated workaround. Weatherall claims that, in
deriving the Hole Argument, we have to make certain additional and mistaken as-
sumptions regarding the identity of mathematical points across diffeomorphically
related models. And according to Curiel [7], one ought reject the Hole Argument not
because it abuses the notion of determinism but since “a proper understanding of dif-
feomorphism invariance and the way to properly implement it as a formal procedure
vitiates [the argument]” (p.10). The details of either of these projects are beside the
point since neither Curiel nor Weatherall critique the notion of determinism used in
the Hole Argument, let alone raise the issue.24 Strictly speaking, these projects are
tangential to the sophisticated determinism since they allow an assumption which
the sophisticated determinist explicitly rejects.
There remains one final task before concluding. In [5] Brighouse argues against
her original [3, 4] defenses of sophisticated determinism as well as against Melia’s [20]
variant of it. Allow me a few words to address her concerns. In that paper, Brighouse
insists on the following intuitive, though unqualified, concept of determinism:
I am going to argue that sophisticated determinism ends up violating the
spirit of the intuitive conception of determinism that we started with in
Section 2, namely, that a world is deterministic if and only if there is at
most one possible future compatible with its past. (p.165)
Accordingly, Brighouse lays down the following challenge:
24From what I can determine, the last paper to discuss sophisticated determinism is Brighouse [5].
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Should someone mount an objection against the intuitive conception of
determinism, and argue that sometimes, even when there is more than
one distinct future compatible with the past then determinism sometimes
still reigns? Only if one has provided a criterion for when different futures
should count as determinism violating futures and when they should not,
and one has provided a justification for this criterion. (p.171)
This seems like a sensible request especially given that the “intuitive notion” actual
happens to be intuitive. Unfortunately, as we all know, intuition is often mistaken. I
argued in §3 that if we do not modify the intuitive conception of determinism, then
every metaphysical structure, every structure whose properties are not constrained
by our physics, is threatened by some hole-type argument and, in §5, that a non-
modified conception of determinism threatens the meaningfulness of the substantival-
relational debate. Even without a better alternative, we have good reason to abandon
the “intuitive notion,” for there is no sense in latching oneself to a sinking ship.
Fortunately though, I have suggested how we might upgrade the intuitive notion in
terms of physical content.
6 Conclusion
The Hole Argument is presented as a challenge from GR to substantival interpreta-
tions of spacetime. It is claimed that GR challenges such interpretations in virtue
of its models being diffeomorphically invariant. In §3, I used the form of the Hole
Argument to demonstrate that GR also challenges the existence of persons (qua em-
bodied souls) in virtue of being invariant under diffeo-metaphysms. In fact, were
the form of the Hole Argument valid, everything would fall prey to some hole-
type argument. In addition, as demonstrated in §5, the very meaningfulness of the
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substantival-relational debate is lost if the form of the Hole-Argument is valid. Thus,
either determinism requires both that there be no metaphysical truths and that the
substantival-relational debate is without meaning or, the na¨ive conception of deter-
minism ought to be rejected in favor of some sophisticated variant of it. According
to the sophisticated variant which I have outlined, deterministic physical theories are
required to determine only physical facts and not also whatever non-physical facts
might be true of the world. Which facts are physical and which are not is decided
only from within some theory-ladened paradigm. As a final reminder, the central
motivation which generated the arguments of this paper is that deterministic theories
ought not be required to determine for future moments what they cannot determine
for any present or past moments.
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